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From the late 1960s through the 1990s, West Germany confronted a domestic and 
international terrorist threat of considerable proportions; a threat that was unimaginative 
to many and a threat that caused considerable tribulations throughout the nation.  This 
thesis analyzes how the ransformation of radical student groups led to the ensuing left 
wing terrorism that arose within the fledgling democracy of the Bonn Republic, and the 
means by which the national government sought to suppress it.  The thesis examines the 
evolution of official policy toward the terrorists and their supporting network, as well as 
the sometimes highly critical public reaction that these efforts inspired.  It also considers 
the adaptations and reactions of the terrorists to official measures taken against them by 
the state.  The thesis concludes by considering alternative measures, offer 
recommendations, and suggestions that might have better served the German government 
during its thirty-year ordeal against the Red Army Faction, June 2 Movement, and other 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis addresses the issue of the emergence of left-wing terrorism in West 
Germany starting in the late 1960s and how it challenged the institutions of West 
Germany the thesis also discusses how the Federal Republic of Germany combated this 
brand of terrorism.  It will examine and evaluate the effectiveness of the measures that 
were instituted by the government to curtail the terrorist’s actions. 
Many people are often confused and interchange the words terror and terrorism.  
Terror is imposed by the mighty onto the weak.  However, just the opposite is true for 
terrorism where the minority try to impose their will onto the more powerful majority.  
This distinction is necessary in order to show that the Red Army Faction and the other 
Left-Wing radical groups were engaging in terrorist activities while the Federal Republic 
was deeply concerned with rekindling the memories of the previous government that 
suppressed the public with an atmosphere of terror.  Combating terrorism has been and is 
a worldwide challenge.  Terrorism and combating international terrorism as a systematic 
approach is relatively new to Americans, but to Europeans and Germany, terrorism has 
been a difficult issue for political leaders to deal with for decades.  Initially, the paper 
will consider the beginning stages of left-wing terrorism in Germany.  It needs to be 
stated that there will be no in-depth analysis of right wing terrorism.  While this brand of 
terror is somewhat prevalent in Germany today as well as from the 1960s to 1990s, they 
are not to be included in any manner in this thesis.1  There was an analytic difference 
between right- and left-wing terrorism in terms of the government’s response.  While 
Germany suffered intermittent right wing-terrorism, most of it was not classified as 
                                                 
1 See Bruce Hoffman’s Right-Wing Terrorism in West Germany Right-Wing Terrorism in West 
Germany. Santa Monica, CA. Rand. October 1986 for information on this particular brand of terrorism in 
West Germany. 
2 
terrorism until the 1980s2, and there was little doubt that the Federal Republic’s action of 
counterterrorism was geared towards the actions and activities of the left.3 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to answer the following major research question: How and why 
was the Federal Republic of Germany effective in combating terrorism from the late 
1960s to the 1990s?  In order to answer this question and evaluate the policies of the 
West German government, subsidiary questions need to be addressed as well: What were 
the policies of West Germany toward the radicals in the inception of growing discontent?  
How would the government react to the terrorist’s arrangement with international 
terrorists from within the continent as well as organizations in the Middle East? 
Social revolutionary terrorism began in Germany in the 1960’s and lasted 
sporadically until the 1990’s.  How do you start a revolution in one of the world's richest, 
modern democracies?  The Baader-Meinhof group, aka the Red Army Faction, attempted 
to start a revolution in the late 1960’s in West Germany by first starting with rock 
throwing, arson, and burglaries and eventually growing to bombings, kidnappings, and 
murders. 
The main terrorist organization that brought the word terrorism to many Germans 
was the Red Army Faction, also widely known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, and splinter 
groups such as the June 2nd Movement.  The crisis years between 1968 and 1977 
represented one of the most tumultuous era in West Germany's entire social-political 
history.  The student protests of 1967-1968 that promised so much hope quickly fizzled 
into riots.  A select few of the radicals had no time for a march.  They wanted revolution, 
and sought to kick-start the cause through terrorism.  There were three separate and 
uniquely different “generations” encompassing the life span of the RAF.  Each generation 
followed a trend of increased violence, decreased occurrences, and improved 
professionalism.  The thesis will go into detail on the measures taken during each 
                                                 
2 Peter H. Merkl, “Rollerball or Neo-Nazi Violence?,” in Peter H. Merkl (ed.) Political Violence and 
Terror, Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1986 and Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2000, 
Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2000.  Available at 
http://www.eng.bmi.bund.de/frame/liste/sonstiges/www.eng.bmi.bund.de/Publications, Accessed on May 
2003. 
3 John E. Finn, Constitutions in Political Crisis.  Political Violence and the Rule of Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 206-216. 
3 
respective “generation” as well as describing each “generation”.  What was the attraction 
of the Baader-Meinhof Gang at the time?  In the shallow sense, there were only a very 
small number of people doing these attacks and sheltering them but a lot of children and 
adolescents thought they were cool.  They wore leather jackets and were full of sexy girls 
and were led by a handsome guy (Baader).  This was the German equivalency to the 
Beatles!  Historically speaking, the soon to be dubbed “68ers”, were extremely conscious 
of the suppressive and authoritarian Nazi regime that had scared and frightened an entire 
nation.  Politically speaking, they wanted change.  The “68ers” were restless with the 
status quo and the “imperialism” of the United States and Germany itself but the left 
wing terrorists were faced with the problem of how is terrorism used to achieve a 
political agenda?  At one level, the question is unanswerable in the same way child abuse 
and rape is incomprehensible.  For people who do not believe that violence is ever 
acceptable except to defend oneself or other innocent people, it is impossible to fathom 
what would motivate people to harm innocent bystanders; an element so integral to 
terrorism.  However, clearly given the number of terrorist acts that occur in the world to 
other people, terrorism is something that simply makes good political sense. 
Where did the Baader-Meinhof Gang get their influences?  Primarily, it was from 
Mao Zedong and a few South American guerrilla leaders.  In a way, the most important 
thing about the Baader-Meinhof Gang is that they read the guerrilla theories of Che 
Guevara and Carlos Marighella and decided to translate it to Western Germany.  They 
translated a manual for warfare in one of the world's poorest countries to a manual of 
warfare in one of the world’s richest.  This new era of terrorism was influenced and 
helped by the Stasi, the East German intelligence, to include funding, finding jobs for 
fugitives, and supplying refuge to escapees. 
In the political terrorism book by Schmidt and Youngman, they cited 109 
different definitions of terrorism obtained in a survey of leading academics in the field.  
From these definitions, the authors isolated the following recurring elements, in order of 
their statistical appearance in the definitions4: Violence, force (appeared in 83.5% of the 
definitions); political (65%); fear, emphasis on terror (51%); threats (47%); psychological 
                                                 
4 Alex P Schmid and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism. A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, 
Data Bases, Theories, and Literature, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988, p. 5.  
4 
effects and anticipated reactions (41.5%); discrepancy between the targets and the victims 
(37.5%); intentional, planned, systematic, organized action (32%); and methods of 
combat, strategy, tactics (30.5%).  Respondents were also asked the following question: 
“What issues in the definition of terrorism remain unresolved?”  Some of the answers 
follow5:  
• The boundary between terrorism and other forms of political violence  
• Whether government terrorism and resistance terrorism are part of the 
same phenomenon  
• Separating “terrorism” from simple criminal acts, from open war between 
“consenting” groups, and from acts that clearly arise out of mental illness  
• Is terrorism a sub-category of coercion? Violence? Power? Influence?  
• Can terrorism be legitimate? What gains justify its use?  
• The relationship between guerilla warfare and terrorism  
• The relationship between crime and terrorism 
What is terrorism?  There are hundreds of definitions that are possible, ranging 
from academic versions to legal versions.  Even the Federal Republic of Germany has 
issued various statements of what terrorism is over the years.  With that being said, the 
definition that is most correct given the period to be examined and the country in 
question, the German Federal Republic’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution in 
1985 stated that, “[t]errorism is the enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, 
which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other 
persons, especially by means of severe crimes as detailed in Article 129a, sect. one of the 
penal law book (above all: murder, homicide, extortionist kidnapping, arson, setting off a 
blast by explosives) or by means of other acts of violence, which serve as preparation of 
such criminal acts.”6 
The next question is what is left-wing terrorism?  Left-wing terrorists were and 
are out to destroy capitalism and replace it with a communist or socialist regime.  Since 
they see most civilians as suffering from capitalist exploitation, left-wing terrorists 
sometimes have limited their use of violence to avoid hurting the victims they say they 
                                                 
5 Schmidt, pp. 29-30. 
6  Information obtained from the website http://www.utcc.ac.th/amsar/about/document7.html, written 
by Alex P Schmid and Albert Jongman. 
5 
want to save.  Left-wing terrorists sometimes focus instead on such tactics as kidnapping 
tycoons or bombing monuments.7  Other such prominent groups were the Red Brigades 
of Italy and the Japanese Red Army Faction.     
After one establishes what terrorism is and specifically what is left-wing 
terrorism, one must now ascertain how to combat it.  The establishment of what German 
leadership thought was “effective” in combating terrorism and their definition and 
thoughts often swayed.  Quite simply it had to since the terrorist themselves changed 
from the more traditional left-wing arson and rioting to the more violent kidnapping, 
murder, and bombs with the added ingredient of international terrorism.  Chancellor 
Schmidt was faced with several issues that included the concern of Germany’s repressive 
past, curtailing civil liberties of people in a relative new democracy, and whether to treat 
these radicals as mere criminals or terrorists.  The government decided to incorporate stiff 
but necessary stopgap measures like legislative changes to the German Basic Law and 
Criminal Code.  
No terrorist expert has come up with a common definition of what effectiveness 
means when dealing with combating terrorism.  Yonah Alexander has established the 
best available definition by establishing criteria on which this paper will focus.  
“Reduction in the number of terrorist incidents, reduction in the number of casualties in 
terrorist incidents, reduction in the monetary cost inflicted by terrorist incidents, 
reduction in the size of terrorist groups operating in a country, number of terrorists killed 
captured, and/or convicted, protection of national infrastructures, preservation of basic 
national structures and policies.”8 
Lastly, the issue that has to be asked is did the Left-Wing terrorists create a lasting 
impact on Germany?  The German Left in the 1960s was a rather large, heterogeneous 
and colorful force that had gigantic dreams of drastic change.  From this, the Greens and 
the anti-nuclear movement of the late 1970s and 1980s were created.  The Greens and the 
anti-nuclear movement had a tremendous impact on German society, and at times, it 
                                                 
7 Council on Foreign Relations, “Types of Terrorism”, Available at 
http://www.terrorismanswers.com/terrorism/types2.html. 
8 Yonah Alexander, Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2002. 
6 
appeared that the Baader-Meinhof Gang was just a vicious and out of control sideshow 
that has struggled to keep its hope and beliefs alive.  Therefore, did the RAF and the 
other left wing terrorists self-destruct or did the West German government generally 
squash the terrorists, albeit over thirty plus years?  The following chapters will address 
this question. 
B. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into five chapters.  Chapter II: “The Emergence of Left-
Wing Terrorism,” describes and examines the emergence of terrorism in the late 1960s 
and organizations such as the APO and the establishment of the Grand Coalition and how 
they effected the student movement.  The chapter will describe the birth of the Red Army 
Faction (RAF) and its splinter groups, the June 2nd movement and Revolutionary Cells 
(RZ).  This chapter will examine several questions, including:  What was the makeup of 
the groups?  What were their beliefs and how did these come about? Why did the groups 
shift from attacks on property to attacks on people?   
Chapter III: “How Did the Government Combat the Terrorist,” goes into detail 
about the various methods and means the government attempted to defeat the terrorists.  
One such way was the passing of the 17th Constitutional amendment, which included 
numerous changes to previous Articles of the German Basic Law and to the newly 
created “state of tension” and “state of defense”9.  The federal government had 
undertaken a massive reorganization in order to reorganize central and state governments 
while trying to evaluate their ability to respond to the security threats that left-wing 
terrorists now presented.  In addition, the issue of how the German Left Wing terrorists 
collaborated with international terrorists will be examined.  
Chapter IV:  “Analysis of the Government’s Fight Against Terrorism,” will 
scrutinize the effectiveness of the previously mentioned measures.  This is where the use 
of the predetermined definition of effectiveness is most needed.  Discussion of the 
methods that Germany needed to adapt from the late 1960s on to effectively combat 
terrorism will follow.  Immediately and for a couple of years after the initial acts of 
terrorism, German polls showed that a significant number of Germans, 10 to 20%, 
                                                 
9 Both terms were inserted into the German Basic Law in 1968 and will be talked about in greater 
detail in Chapter III. 
7 
supported the terrorists cause, which was primarily anti-American and anti-capitalist in 
one way or another.  This number dwindled significantly over the long run.  Was this 
directly related to the government’s handling of the situation?  Due to the measures 
implemented?  It is necessary to address both of these questions. 
Chapter V:  “Conclusions,” reviews the major areas of analysis and arguments 
presented in the preceding chapters.  In general, the government was indeed effective in 
combating the terrorists but the terrorists themselves often-committed mistakes that 
increased the government’s ability to be successful.  This chapter is designed not only to 
fuse the conclusions reached in the thesis, but also to provide some recommendations for 
future policy on the issue of combating domestic terrorism as well as international 
terrorism. 
While the underlying beliefs and views of the terrorists groups might have 
changed over time, many problems that faced the German government and police in the 
1960’s still face them today.  In addition, there are similarities to the German’s ordeal 
with left-wing terrorism as the United States is confronted with at present.  Issues such as 
civil liberties and international terrorism need to be tackled by the United States today. 
Within a few days of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
most Germans knew that at least three of the 19 terrorists suspected of having hijacked 
the planes had been living in Hamburg, including the Egyptian student Mohamed Atta, 
who is to have been the mastermind behind the attacks.  Within a few weeks, they knew 
that Osama bin Laden's German network had probably included as many as 70 other 
sleepers spread across most of the big cities of Western Germany, and that one hijacker 
had even been traced to a town in eastern Germany, a part of the country not known for 































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
9 
II. THE BIRTH OF LEFT WING TERRORISM, THE RED ARMY 
FACTION AND OTHERS  
Social revolutionary terrorism began in Germany in the 1960s and lasted 
sporadically until the 1990s.  There were several reasons, events, and people that helped 
change the peaceful protests of the early to mid-sixties to the death and destruction that 
would ensue from the terrorists.  Three distinct “generations” encompassed the account 
of the most recognized terrorist group, the Red Army Faction (RAF), in the history of the 
Federal Republic of Germany.  The first generation lasted from April 2, 1968 to the 
deaths of the founding members of the RAF in prison on October 17, 1977.  The second 
generation encompassed late summer of 1977 until late 1982.  This generation made a 
determined decision to use armed struggle from the beginning.  Finally, the third 
generation lasted from 1984 until the final communiqué that was released to the German 
media disestablishing itself in 1998.  There were also other groups that came about after 
the existence of the RAF, for instance, the Movement 2 June, the West Berlin 
Tupamaros10, and Revolutionary Cells.  Why did the student protests evolve to such a 
previously unseen terrorist phenomenon?  
The decade of the 1930s and its generation of Nazi’s would lay the groundwork 
for the problems to come in the forthcoming decades.  The horrific ways of the SS and 
their intervening and suppressive approach to civil liberties were images and thoughts 
that would linger in the mindset of the next generation.  This almost paranoia was 
captured by the 1962 der Spiegel affair.  The police raided the weekly magazine’s offices 
after the publication of an article attacking the Government’s defense policy.  A couple of 
Ministers attempted an immediate cover-up.  In early 1963, Bernward Vesper, who was 
one of the main authors of a small publishing house called “Studio for New Literature,” 
stated, “For the first time, we felt the powerlessness of people delivered up to the political 
                                                 
10 Members of the West Berlin's Kommune I formed a low-level urban guerrilla group called 
“Tupamaros West Berlin” during the late sixties.  Later the group disbanded, and the core members 
founded the Movement 2 June.  Another low-level urban guerrilla group called “Tupamaros Munich” was 
also formed during the late sixties, but also disbanded without causing much harm.  This information was 
taken from http://baader-meinhof.com/terminology/terms/tupamaros.html article called Tupamaros written 
by Richard Huffman.  Accessed August 2003. 
10 
machine.  We were afraid.”11  The twenty-five year old images of suppressive Nazi 
Germany, images that the Federal Republic of Germany so intensely tried not to repeat, 
were now being rekindled into the national spotlight.  
A. GRAND COALITION 
The starting point for this specific revolution was difficult to establish, but the 
predominant thought is that the revolution first gained its roots after the formation of the 
Grand Coalition between the two major political parties in Germany, the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD).  Both failed to win a 
majority in the 1966 national election.  Unable to form a coalition with one of the smaller 
parties, the CDU and SPD, supposedly archrivals formed a “Grand Coalition” to create a 
government with a supermajority comprising over 95% of the Bundestag.  Perceived by 
various Germans to be in direct contrast to the spirit of democracy, Professor Helmut 
Gollwitzer12 best summarized this feeling in a university speech to students in 1967, 
when he said: 
Grand Coalition means the vanishing of parliamentary opposition.  The 
freedom of that opposition which acts outside parliament therefore 
becomes even more vital.  Every professor, every student is for his own 
sake, for the sake of the university and for the sake of our country… 
interested in the freedom of that opposition.13 
The Grand Coalition was very disillusioning to young left-leaning students who 
traditionally supported the SPD, and loathed the CDU.  People are always decrying the 
lack of political choice behind the Iron Curtain, the students would note, but would ask 
what makes us so different if we have one “super-party” that supposedly represents the 
interests of 95% of our population.  The Grand Coalition lasted until 1969.    
                                                 
11 Stefan Aust, The Baader-Meinhof Group: The Inside Story of a Phenomenon, London: The Bodley 
Head, 1985, p. 27. 
12 Helmut Gollwitzer taught from 1957 to 1975 as a professor at the Free University in Berlin.  He 
belonged to the most well known and most formed theologians in Germany.  He expressed himself 
particularly clearly in connection with the student movement, in addition, in the context of the 
controversies discussions about the activities of the Red Army Faction.   
13 Christoph Rojahn, Left-Wing Terrorism in Germany: The Aftermath of Ideological Violence, 
Warwickshire, Great Britain, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, Conflict Studies; 
313, October 1998, p. 2. 
11 
In West Berlin, as in most places in the democratic world, college campuses were 
the location for much political and social ferment during the tumultuous decade of the 
1960s.  Many university students, together with friends who were not in school, began 
experimenting with illegal drugs like pot and hashish and wearing a uniform of rebellion 
to distinguish themselves from their elders: jeans and t-shirts for everyone, long hair and 
beards for males.  Some tried communal living.  Student organizations grew up to 
challenge the archaic rules at colleges and demand that students have more of a voice in 
how they were educated.  Many new political groups and public protests were organized.  
One such group that became one of great infamy was the free-living and free-loving late-
1960s social experiment called West Berlin's “Kommune I”.14  There were many 
Kommunes beside Kommune I, such as Kommune II and the Wieland Kommune.  They 
became the seedbeds for future terrorists’ recruits.  Many of Kommune I's members were 
prominent student leaders in the nearby Free University and included some of the best-
known Federal Republic’s young left wing radicals: Fritz Teufel, Rainer Langhans, 
Dieter Kunzelmann, and Rudi Dutschke.  They tended to inject a strong element of 
clownishness into politics.  Dieter Kunzelmann was the most deliberately outrageous 
character out of the four.  Although Rudi Dutschke’s stay at Kommune I was brief, he 
became a big shot among radicals and appeared on TV to speak of the Federal Republic 
leaning toward Fascism.  Kommune I became prominent for advocating and carrying out 
humorous “praxis” like flinging paint-filled balloons at the American consulate.  Several 
members of the Kommune were arrested in the late sixties, charged with conspiring to 
bomb American Vice-President Hubert Humphrey during a visit.  The Kommune 
members were released when it became apparent that their “bombs” were actually 
balloons filled with custard.   
Within a few short years, this student organization had veered sharply leftward.  
Perhaps it was because so few people were able to get to West Germany from the East 
and so refresh people’s memories as to the reality of life in a communist dictatorship.  
                                                 
14 A Kommune was in its primitive form a group of people who live together and share everything, 
including shelter, food, significant others and most importantly an ideology.  Kommune I was specifically 
students who were in their mid-twenties that studied and became involved in the student affairs of the Free 
University.  This group included Rudi Dutschke, Fritz Teufel, and Rainer Langhans, all three would 
become very active towards in the road towards terrorism.  As Becker would say in Hitler’s Children: The 
Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang, New York, J. B. Lippincott, 1977, they would become 
“notorious as a troupe of political jesters, trendsetters, student leaders, convention deifiers”. 
12 
Thus, it was easy to romanticize Marx, always so much better in fantasy that in practice.  
Posters of Mao, along with Fidel, began appearing on the walls of West Berlin’s college 
dorms.  A group called the Socialist Student Union, in German Sozialistischer Deutscher 
Studenbund, or SDS, became popular with young radicals.  This SDS had no connection 
to the Students for a Democratic Society in the United States but was akin to it in being 
both left wing and youth-oriented.  One of the chief targets of the radicals was the 
Springer publishing firm, a large company whose organs were staunchly conservative and 
often attacked the left. 
B. EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY OPPOSTION (APO)  
Besides protests and sit-ins, there were other ways that the students would deal 
with some of the internal problems in Germany.  When Germans grew disillusioned with 
the so-called “Grand Coalition” of the two major political parties, the left-wing SPD and 
the right-wing CDU, they did not give up on politics altogether.  Instead, they formed an 
“anti” political party; the Extra Parliamentary Opposition (APO).  The APO was the 
student-initiated opposition movement in West Germany during the late sixties and early 
seventies.  In many ways, it was a product of a German trait, a strong desire by radical 
groups to associate with political parties.  Since the Grand Coalition comprised over 95% 
of the Bundestag, there was only a negligible opposition, 5%, in parliament. The APO 
intended to rectify this imbalance in the public arena.  “A community of political opinion 
rather than an organization,”15 is how Becker described the APO.  At its peak, in 1968, 
the APO succeeded in mobilizing around 60,000 workers, students, and leftist SPD 
members.  Firebrand student leader Rudi Dutschke was the leader of the APO movement.  
Specifically for the RAF, two key occurrences that thoroughly influenced their 
ideology was the war in Vietnam and the ever-increasing sentiment of anti-Americanism.  
This feeling of non-freedom and suppression can be traced well back in German history, 
but an event in 1958, called the Kuby affair, appeared to be instrumental in enhancing 
these sentiments.  The first actions begin in Berlin and were directed against 
undemocratic measures of the university administration of the Free University.  In 1965, 
the Free University of Berlin asked Kuby to be a guest addressee.  Erich Kuby was a 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
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journalist who in 1958 stated that the name Free University was “an extreme degree of 
non-freedom”16  This was to imply that the university in East Berlin was not free and he 
believed this was a conscious exasperation of the Cold War.  Protests against the 
prohibition of the speech of the journalist Erich Kuby occurred.  The student council had 
asked Kuby to speak at the 20-year commencement but the rector vehemently refused to 
invite Kuby.  The denial of letting him speak caused a remarkable amount of student 
protests and gained massive press and television coverage.17  Despite appointing a new 
rector, the seeds of discontent and anger were now growing day by day. 
The Vietnam War was the most popular cause for the new left.  Protests, sit-ins, 
and strikes against the United States for its policy in Vietnam were designed to show that 
the students were suffering just like the Vietnamese.  Ulrike Meinhof, prior to joining the 
RAF and still a journalist for the German magazine Konkret, reflected on the conflict of 
how protests should be carried; protests in respect to the Vietnam War.  She stated:  
Those who have understood what the war in Vietnam is all about start to 
walk about with gritted teeth and a very bad conscience; start to realize 
that the inability to stop this war leads to complicity with those waging 
it…On 21 October (1967) rocket carrying leaflets have been shot into 
American barracks in Berlin, calling upon the soldiers to refuse to go to 
Vietnam and to desert instead.  This way of agitation is dangerous, it 
smells badly…Those having the courage to undertake this kind of 
oppositional activity have obviously got the courage to be efficient.  This 
needs to be considered.18 
Soon after the mood of the radical left was changing slightly to a stance that 
encouraged the use of force.  The department store bombing on 2 April 1968 by Andres 
Baader and Gudrun Ensslin both stated that the attack had been committed to protest 
against the war in Vietnam.19 Eventually the mood of the new left was now combining 
their distaste towards the United States and the Vietnam War.  The Baader-Meinhof 
biographer Jillian Becker best captured this view by making mention of one of the chants 
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the students had been yelling at a protest: “Amis [Americans, contemptuous] get out of 
Vietnam and get out of the Dominican Republic too-and give us the right of self-
determination.  Down with the authoritarianism of the university-and of America.”20 
C. EVENTS THAT INFLUENCED THE RED ARMY FACTION  
Two events in particular led to future violence and increased terrorist activity: the 
death of Benno Ohnesorg during a demonstration against the Shah of Iran on June 2, 
1967,21 and the attempted assassination of Rudi Dutschke on April 11, 1968.  To 
elaborate on the first situation, the June 2 demonstration was believed to be the first 
demonstration that Benno had attended.  The pro-Shah crowd whooped with joy while 
the anti-Shah demonstrators chanted negative slogans.  The groups began jostling each 
other and some fighting broke out.  Some among the pro-Shah group had come armed 
with wooden cudgels and violently bashed their opponents who naturally fought back 
furiously.  The cops started making arrests and anti-Shah demonstrators were hit with 
police truncheons.22  A plainclothes police officer shot this 26 year-old married college 
student whose wife was pregnant in the back of the head.  There was a lot of violence and 
dozens of injured people were lying in the streets.  It is believed that because of the 
clothes Benno was wearing23, a plain-clothes sergeant of the Kripo, Karl-Heinz Kuras, 
mistook him for the leader of the radical students, chased him and shot him without 
asking him any questions.24  Ohnesorg’s death became a rallying cry for many on the left 
and led to the founding of the urban terrorist group called “Movement 2 June.”  Although 
separate from the Baader-Meinhof Group, an alliance between the two came about. 
The second situation occurred on April 11, 1968 when Dutschke was riding his 
bicycle to a SDS office and became the victim of an assignation attempt by Josef 
Bachmann.  The three shots caught Dutschke in the head, throat, and chest.  Dutschke 
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would make a full recovery, while his assailant committed suicide in prison.  Dutschke 
would become something of a god-like figure to leftists.  The shooting of Dutschke, 
along with the general resistance of the Federal Republic to the sort of changes desired by 
the radical left, led some of his fellow radicals to eschew pacifism.  Soon after 
Kommune, I fell apart.25  Wolfgang Kraushaar also noted that the end of the APO 
seemed to trigger a substantial radicalization of the left-libertarian movement; “What 
then followed was an inner radicalization, which drove considerable numbers to violence.  
The antiauthoritarianism which had won over all competing political currents in such a 
meteoric way became its own victim.”26  Many of its members participated in the low-
level terrorism of the West Berlin Tupamaros.  Eventually, they became the Baader-
Meinhof Gang and believed that violence was thoroughly justified by the righteousness 
of their cause. 
The next important question to bring up is why terrorism evolved from these 
previous events.  To Meinhof the reason was rather simple and the timing was obvious.  
She stated, “The boundary between verbal protest and physical resistance has been 
transgressed in the protests against the attack on Dutschke these Easter holidays for the 
first time in a massive way, by many, not just individuals, over days, not just once, at 
many places, not only in Berlin, in actual fact, not only symbolically.”27  She goes on 
further by saying that “ [l]et Us State: (speaking on behalf of the APO) Those who from 
political power positions here condemn stone throwing and arson, but not the incitement 
of the House of Springer, not the bombs on Vietnam, not the terror in Iran…their 
commitment to non-violence is hypocritical.”28  Peter Merkl described the situation best 
when he said, “Terrorism, of course is not the logical result of the student movement, but 
one of its offshoots, or a by-product.”29  “Political terrorism would not be able to survive 
without a corresponding ideology for ideology is the decisive criterion and the one that 
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distinguishes terrorism from organized crime.”30  “German terrorists in particular were 
compelled to develop an ideological argument for their actions, since the political 
situation in West Germany does not in any way justify a terrorist strategy.”31 
D. RED ARMY FACTION 
 The main terrorist organization that brought the word terrorism to many Germans 
was the Red Army Faction, also widely known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, and splinter 
groups such as the Movement 2 June.  The crisis years between 1968 and 1977 
represented one of the most tumultuous eras in West Germany's entire social-political 
history.  The student protests of 1967-1968 that promised so much hope quickly fizzled 
into riots.  A select few of the radicals had no time for a march; they wanted revolution, 
and sought to kick-start the cause through terrorism.  As has already been suggested, the 
Red Army Faction’s history of existence can usefully be broken into three separate and 
distinct “generations”.  
1. First Generation  
 The “first generation” came about on April 2, 1968 when two department stores 
in Frankfurt burned in the night after two bombs exploded and caused about $200,000 
worth of damage.  While on a pay phone screaming at the German Press Agency Gudrun 
Ensslin said, “This is a political act of revenge”32.  These individuals plus future 
additions constituted a generation that promoted violence against property.  However, 
violence against people and the use of guns were both tolerable and even encouraged in 
certain situations.  As the underground paper Agit 883 said, “Did some pig really believe 
we would talk about starting the class struggle, the reorganization of the proletariat 
without taking up arms?”33  Captured and then subsequently freed by a deadly jail 
breakout, there was a change in the attitude of the leadership from ordinary criminals to 
something much greater.  There would be no turning back.  Although members of the 
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RAF committed many crimes, the generally regarded birthday is 14 May 1970.34  This is 
the date of the infamous breakout of Andres Baader by Ulrike Meinhoff and their 
cohorts.35   
For a time, it seemed as if the West German model of leftist urban guerrilla 
warfare might have a measure of success.  German polls showed that a significant 
number of Germans supported their cause, which was primarily anti-American and anti-
capitalist while desiring a socialist state, in one way or another. The support of level was 
only 10 to 20%, but a remarkable number nonetheless.36 Further evidence of support was 
in July of 1971.  Institut Allenbach, a public research firm that is comparable in nature 
and standing to the Gallup organization here in the United States, published a noteworthy 
poll.   
Twenty percent of Germans under the age of thirty expressed a certain 
sympathy for the Baader-Meinhof Gang.  One in ten young Northern 
Germans indicated that they would willingly shelter a member of the 
Baader-Meinhof Gang for the night.37   
Unfortunately for them, most of the leaders of the West German terrorist group, 
the Baader-Meinhof Gang, were captured in mid-1972.  Their followers would kidnap 
and kill close to a dozen people over the next five years in an effort to secure their 
leader’s release from prison, but it was all in vain.  No doubt, the terrorists were hoping 
for a continuation of an almost complete submissive policy by the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) government displayed in earlier cases.  For instance, the multiple 
hijackings by Palestinian terrorists in 1970 that resulted in the quick release of terrorists 
and in 1972 when the government paid a five million dollar ransom for the release of 
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hostages.38  The German government used the terrorist crisis to approve new laws giving 
them broad powers in combating terrorism.  Hard-core leftists grumbled, but the majority 
of the German people were firmly on the side of the government.  Furthermore, the leftist 
terrorists were isolating themselves from previous supporters like “Rudi Dutschke, 
Herbert Marcuse, and Heinrich Böll, all leading figures for the splintered remains of the 
extra-parliamentary movement, [who] made an unprecedented move by publishing 
explicit statements in the popular press that distanced themselves from the terrorists and 
rejected their actions as an illegitimate form of oppositional politics.”39 
From 1969-1979 there were only 247 attacks of arson and bombing, 69 attacks on 
people, 25 cases resulting in death, and 69 other serious offenses.40  In comparison, 
eighteen terrorists from the Red Army Faction died during the same period.  On a whole, 
compared to other prominent terrorists groups in other European countries this is a 
relatively low number of attacks.  “The arrest of the leaders of the RAF during the 
summer of 1972, the general assumption in Germany was that terrorism would be 
finished for good.”41   
After the arrests, it appeared that it was pointless to try to win over the working 
class in developed capitalistic countries.  This coincided with the end of the Vietnam 
War, which had been one of the key means of legitimizing the RAF’s acts in the 
beginning stages of its group.  The focus then shifted towards students, marginal groups, 
and suppressed people in Third World countries.  These countries were  
seen as allies, stood high on the RAF’s list of priorities.  This was 
particularly true for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), who 
trained members of the group in the late sixties.42   
The interaction between the PLO and the German terrorist groups first become 
prominent in 1972.43  The RAF was the only group to express solidarity with the Black 
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September Organization, at least in writing.  Many German terrorists trained alongside 
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) organization in 
terrorists camps in Jordon, Lebanon, and South Yemen.  “The main type of cooperation 
between the RAF and RZ and the Palestinian terrorist organizations, was operational 
cooperation.”44  Working with Carlos Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, better known as the famous 
Carlos the Jackal, and the PFLP, several joint-operations were executed.  Some examples 
of the cooperation were “[t]he seizure of the OPEC headquarters in Vienna in 1975, the 
attempted bombing of an El-Al plane in Paris and the attempted hijacking of an El-Al 
plane in Nairobi in January 1975, as well as the hijacking of an Air France plane to 
Entebbe, Uganda, in June 1976.”45  There was a deep commitment by the PFLP towards 
their German comrades, and kidnapping and hijackings were attempted to free 
imprisoned leaders of German terrorist groups.   
Late in 1977, after an airplane hijacking by some Palestinians failed to secure the 
release of the three imprisoned leaders of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the terrorists 
recognized the warning sign.  Allegedly, while in jail at Stammheim, Andreas Baader, 
Gudrun Ensslin, and Jan-Carl Raspe all committed suicide deep in the night of October 
17, 1977.46  However, this issue has been debated for over a quarter century, with many 
believing that they were murdered.  Despite the deaths of the leaders, their movement 
continued its shadowy existence for another twenty years, until its communiqué sent in 
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1998 to a German newspaper.47 Following the shocking death of the leadership, the first 
generation appeared to be deceased but a second generation of RAF terrorists ensued.   
2. The Second Generation  
With the leaders and founding members in jail, the RAF’s “second generation” in 
the summer of 1977, were lead by Christian Klar, Adelheid Schulz and others.48  This 
faction was much more magnificent in lethality.  There was a change in the way the 
terrorists carried out their agenda in comparison to the first generation.  There was a 
concerted decision to use an armed struggle from the beginning.49  In 1980, 77 acts of 
violence were registered and by 1981, the number of attacks had increased to 129.50  
Why the change to violence?  A key point in the evolution of a terrorist group is when a 
death occurs to a member; specifically to the RAF were the deaths after the hunger strike.  
The death of Holger Meins and the decision to take up arms were the same.  It seemed 
that reflection was not possible anymore. The whole situation favored the idea of going 
underground and the only thing that was missing was the connection. 
In addition, Klein describes the death of Holger Meins as the “decisive point” at 
which “to break with the legal policy of helplessness and powerlessness”51  
If all I needed not only to propagate armed struggle but also to take it up 
myself was the right kick then Holger Meins was the “kick.”  His death 
made my misery and my powerlessness in the face of this political system 
reach such a pitch that it became too much for me.  I had had enough of 
legal policy and I was prepared to fight.52 
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This generation was much less organized and only produced one major 
ideological publication and that was in 1982.  In addition, this generation was not fighting 
for its conclusions but was using those articulated by the previous groups.53  In 1979-
1981, there was a concentrated attack on American targets and personnel.  Two specific 
attacks were first, an attempted assignation of General Alexander Haig, the Supreme 
Commander of NATO forces in Europe on June 25, 1979.  A second example was when 
a bomb exploded near the headquarters of the United States Air Force in Ramstein on 
August 31, 1981.  Finally, the leader Christian Klar and Adelheid Schultz were arrested 
in late 1982 and this event marked the end of the second generation. 
3. The Third Generation  
Once again, the disappearance of a key leadership figure marked a major 
transition in the history of the terrorist movement, without ending it.  Within nor more 
than a couple of years, a third generation of terrorist agitation was visibly underway, as 
was evidenced by a wave of particularly spectacular and cold-blooded murders and bomb 
attacks against some of the highest ranking and best protected personalities of the 
country.  These included Ernst Zimmermann, head of the German armament corporation 
MTU (1985), Karl Heinz Beckurts (member of the board of Siemens) (1986), Alfred 
Herrhausen, speaker of the board of Deutsche Bank (1989) and Detlev Karsten 
Rohwedder, chief of the “Treuhand-Anstalt”, the public trust-company in charge of 
privatization, respectively liquidation of the former East German public sector (1991).54  
This generation of the RAF focused on three main points: first, trying to cooperate with 
other European terrorist groups; secondly, disregarding the previous generations’ 
persistent demand for freedom of imprisoned members, and changing the focus to 
attacking military and industrial complexes; and thirdly, operating with extreme  
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professionalism.  Evidence of the last point is that from 1981 to the 1993 shoot-out in 
Bad Kleined 55, the police found no fingerprints from any RAF member at any RAF 
attack.   
E. MOVEMENT 2 JUNE 
Movement 2 June was the second most prominent left-wing German urban 
guerrilla group of the seventies.  Based in West Berlin and founded by former members 
of Kommune I, the formation of Movement 2 June occurred around 1971.  Built from the 
remnants of a small, proto-terrorist group called Berlin Tupamaros, Movement 2 June 
had been around for about three years.  The group mostly bombed property targets in 
Berlin.  Movement 2 June achieved its greatest “victory” in 1975 when it kidnapped Peter 
Lorenz, the CDU candidate for Berlin mayor in the upcoming election.  The kidnappers 
demanded and secured the release of four of their imprisoned comrades and Horst Mahler 
from the RAF and then were flown to South Yemen where Lorenz was released 
unharmed the next day.  Movement 2 June remained loosely connected to the Baader-
Meinhof Gang, but more often than not, the two groups feuded.  Baader-Meinhof was 
more Marxist in nature, while Movement 2 June was almost anarchist.  Movement 2 June 
disbanded early in the 1980s, with many of its members joining the Red Army Faction.   
F. REVOLUTIONARY CELLS (RZ) 
A third group, called the Revolutionary Cells (RZ), had roots in the 1970s as well.  
Among their more striking achievements were the June 1981 bombings of the U.S. Army 
Fifth Corps headquarters in Frankfurt and of officer clubs in Geinhauusen, Bamberg, and 
Hanua.  In addition, they claimed responsibility for the numerous bombings that preceded 
President Regan’s visit to Germany in 1982.  While similar to the RAF in their quest for a 
revolution, the RZ held a different opinion on who should fight.  Peter Merkl described 
the difference best when he stated,  
From the beginning in 1973, the RZ differentiated itself by taking 
exception to the RAF theory that only the ‘revolutionary intelligentsia,’ or 
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student elites, should guide the revolution.  Instead they stressed the need 
to keep action in contact with the masses, a kind of Maoist ‘mass line.’56  
The Kommune, APO, and the student protests of 1966 established the seeds of 
revolution that was to take place in West Germany and, as it were hoped and imagined, 
throughout the Third World.  One cannot forget Germany’s history.  Meinhof herself 
stated in 1974  
[r]esistance does not become something wrong just because of the 
lengthiness of the war.  What do the comrades expect anyway in a country 
that has allowed Auschwitz to happen without any resistance?  Whose 
working class has the history of the German working class and whose 
police the history of the SS?57   
However, those advocating protest consolidated a new and more radical approach 
after the passing of the new “Emergency Laws” for they felt that their basic political 
rights and the entire democratic structure were under attack.  With the increase of 
frequency and lethality in terrorists’ attacks and the apparent failure of police brutality to 
subdue these problems, the West German government was backed into a corner and had 
to react in some forceful manner, even if that meant curtailing civil liberties and 
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III. MEASURES TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT 
With the growth of the Red Army Faction, 2nd June Movement, and the 
Revolutionary Cells (RZ) in the 1960s and early 1970s, the West German government 
was forced to deal with these terrorists, as well as with the sympathizers and potential 
supporters.  From 1978 to 1983, there were 1,537 arrests of “left-wing extremists”, who 
were sentenced for violations of laws unrelated to terrorism as such.58  Differing opinions 
on how to handle the groups arose, ranging from pacification and appeasement to outright 
brutality and violence aimed at wiping out any resemblance of the rebellious youth.  
Specific measures included immense expansion of police technologies, the restriction of 
constitutional rights for citizens, the use of the media, changes to the Basic Law and the 
German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) and finally the decision to change from passive 
to coercive force in the fight against terrorism.  As it is a distraction to be able to 
understand how to combat a terrorist or terrorist organization, one must be able to 
differentiate between counter terrorism (offensive measures) and anti-terrorism 
(defensive measures).  Counterterrorism involves offensive measures taken to prevent, 
deter, and respond to terrorism.  The general objective of anti-terrorism programs is 
neutralizing terrorist groups.  As in most stability and support operations, neutralization 
in this context means rendering the source of threat benign, not necessarily killing the 
terrorists.  In counterterrorism, the objective can be further refined as preventing attacks 
and minimizing the effects if one should occur.  It includes any action to weaken the 
terrorist organization and its political power and to make potential targets more difficult 
to attack.   
A. ANTI-TERRORIST LEGISLATION 
The initial anti-terrorist legislation resulted from government and state reactions 
to the APO faction in the 1960s.  There were several high level meetings among the 
legislatures of both houses in the spring of 1968.  The first was held on April 17, 1968 
where it was announced that the “government would use all legal means to deal with 
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radical left-wing student groups such as the Socialist German Student League (SDS)”59.  
On May 16, 1968, the second reading of the emergency legislation was completed and 
two weeks later emergency legislation was passed with a two-thirds majority.  
1. 17TH Amendment 
On June 24 1968, the 17th constitutional amendment was adopted, encompassing 
major revisions and introducing emergency procedures.  This encompassed amending 
several articles of the basic law:  
• Article nine pertaining to association.  The sentence “measures taken 
pursuant to articles 12a, 35 II & III, 87a IV, or 91 may not be directed 
against industrial conflicts engaged in by associations to safeguard and 
improve working and economic conditions in the sense”60 that all 
Germans have the right to form clubs and societies was inserted. 
• Article 10 letters, mail, and telecommunication.  “Where a restriction 
serves the protection of the free democratic basic order or the existence or 
security of the Federation or a State [Land], the statue may stipulate that 
the person affected shall not be informed and that recourse to the courts 
shall be replaced by a review of the case by bodies and auxiliary bodies 
appointed by Parliament.”61 
• Article 11 movement.  The words “or pursuant to a statue” as well as the 
partial sentence “to avert an imminent danger to the existence or the free 
democratic basic order of the Federation or a State [Land]” and “to deal 
with natural disasters or particularly grave accidents”62 were added. 
• Article 12 work and forced labor.  All Germans have the right to choose 
their job freely.  The practice of an occupation can be regulated by “or 
pursuant to” a statue.6364 
• Article 19 restriction of basic rights.  If any person’s rights have been 
violated than they have the recourse to go to court.  Recourse is available 
to the courts of ordinary jurisdiction only if no other jurisdiction has been 
established.  “Article 10 II 2 is not affected by the provisions of this 
paragraph.”65 
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• Article 73 exclusive legislation.  Foreign affairs and defense, the words 
“including the protection of the civilian population”66 were added. 
• Article 87a establishment of armed forces.  The key point here is that any 
use of the armed forces in the role of supporting the police and the Federal 
Border Guard while protecting civilian property and battling against 
armed insurgents has to have the consent of the Bundestag or the 
Bundesrat.67 
• Article 91a participation of the Federation.  To avoid imminent danger to 
basic order of the Federation or State, a State may call upon police forces 
of other States “or of the forces and facilities of other administrative 
authorities and of the Federal Border Guard.”  Secondly, if the State in 
danger is not willing to act then the Government may place police forces 
in that State under its own control “and use units of the Federal Border 
Guard”68 
Some sections were repealed as well, including Articles 59a, 65a, paragraph (2), 
142a and 143.  Articles 12a, military and other services, 53a, composition, rules of 
procedure under the Chapter IVa Joint Committee, 80a, state of tension, 115a-1 state of 
defense69, were introduced for the first time and new parts of Article 20 basic principles 
of state and resistance, and Article 35 legal, administration, and emergency assistance, 
were inserted. 
2. "State of Tension” and “State of Defense” 
The Bundestag incorporated amendments into the Basic Law that introduced the 
constitutional concepts of a “state of tension” and “state of defense” as provisions to 
handle emergencies.  The “state of defense” asked the question when does an emergency 
exist.  The amendment states simply that,  
it exists if the Federal Republic is under attack by an armed force or if 
such an attack is directly imminent.  Only then can the Federal 
government request the Bundestag to determine a “state of defense.70   
The “state of tension” occurs: 
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[W]hen the federal law on defense, including the protection of the civilian 
population, stipulates that legal provisions may only be applied in 
accordance with this Article [80a], their application shall, except when a 
state of defense exists, be admissible only after the Bunestag has 
determined that a state of tension exists or if it has specifically approved 
such application.71   
The passing of these amendments affected the Federal Republic of Germany’s 
Government as a whole because of the ensuing battle that took place between the states 
and central government over the newly passed amendments.72  In the case of extreme 
emergencies, the newly formed Joint Committee73 acted as a: 
kind of substitute legislature in times of emergency, [they] shall make the 
determination  in place of the Bundestag and Bundesrat if there is urgent 
need for immediate action and it is absolutely impossible for immediate 
action and it is absolutely impossible for the Bundestag to meet in time, or 
it there is no quorum present in that body.74  
The West German government in the 1970s was well aware of its action in the 
late 1960s actions that ultimately lead to an increase of terrorism inside its borders.  In 
the seventies there seemed to be a general push towards police work in solving the 
criminal acts perpetrated by the various student organizations.  There was great anti-
government and anti-capitalist sentiment in all parts of West Germany in the late 1960s 
and thereafter, as previously stated, but the West German government was extremely 
careful not to overreact to terrorist acts, thus avoiding a vicious cycle of action-reaction 
violence.   
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B. LEVEL OR RESPONSE 
The first level of response from Bonn was the legislative makeshift legal 
adaptations that were enacted in the early 1970s.  These laws were something of a 
stopgap measure and dealt with civil aviation and hostage taking.  On January 28, 1972, 
the so-called Berufverbot created a set of exclusionary guidelines for civil service 
applicants, which denied government jobs to anyone implicated in civil unrest.  A 
January 1973 weapons law established nationwide control over guns and ammunition.75  
On February 15, 1974 the Conference of Ministers of the Interior made the 
Grenzschutzgruppen 9 (GSG-9) duties precise.   
As stated by Major John D. Elliot  before the United States Congress in 1978, “[i]t 
is evident that the terrorists expected Bonn to overreact to their attacks and begin a series 
of increasingly repressive measures that would drive the population into the arms of the 
terrorists.”76  As Dr Nicholas Berry points out  
[w]orking for justice is a prerequisite for tracking down and bringing to 
account those who reject the pursuit of justice.  It facilitates and 
legitimizes the use of force against hard-core terrorists.  Without taking 
into consideration the motives of terrorists and dealing with those 
grievances that may have merit, counter-terrorism is compelled to rely on 
brute force.77   
This is precisely what the terrorists had hoped to happen.  This would have 
allowed the RAF to justify the increased level of terrorist activities.  Since the 
government did not overreact, the RAF and others never received that wave of support 
from the “common people” to allow the overthrow of the government they so desperately 
desired.   
Around this time, there was a shift in the collective attitude of the government on 
what actions would be necessary to deal with the terrorists.  Stefan Aust expressed the 
mood of the spring of 1972 when he stated,  
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this was not the time for reason.  The newspapers were stirring up more 
fear of the Baader-Meinhof group daily, whipping up emotions, and thus 
giving the members of the group, who regularly studied the reports of their 
activities in the press, a sense of their own accomplishments.78   
Karrin Hanshew supports the belief that there was a change when she said: 
[t]he general consensus on where the line between democratic and 
undemocratic uses of state force lay began to break down in the wake of 
Federal Attorney General Siegfried Buback’s murder in April 1977.  Only 
then did leaders of both the SPD and the FDP begin to show signs of 
support for CDU proposals to monitor all oral communications between 
imprisoned terrorists and their defending attorneys—a limitation of an 
individual’s constitutional rights that the coalition government had 
previously killed when it came to the parliament floor in 1974 and again in 
1976.79 
When the arrests of Baader, Raspe, Ensslin, Muller, and Meins took place all 
occurring from June 1 to 15 June, many in Bonn made a collective sigh of relief and 
thought that the ringleaders were now taken care of.  Ironically, these leaders would 
become a nuisance in jail that was almost as dangerous as if they were still free.  The 
still-at-large members of the RAF were now on a mission to ensure the release of their 
fellow comrades.  Attempts, like the 1975 taking of the German Embassy in Stockholm, 
failed in achieving their goal. 
There was a countrywide attempt at spreading propaganda to give the impression 
that the prisoners were living under inhumane conditions.  In reality, they had cells bigger 
than fellow prisoners had and were blessed to have extra benefits that others did not have, 
including radio, television and an abundance of books.  Support groups like Anti-Fascist 
Group, the Solidarity Committee for Political Prisoners, and Red Help all were diehard 
supporters that strove to spread anti-German ideas.  However, the best supporter group 
appeared to have been the member’s attorneys, for they smuggled in almost anything they 
wanted, including guns.80  In 1976, the 24 imprisoned members of RAF had established a 
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network system that allowed them to keep in touch with not only themselves but also 
their free comrades and thus allowing them to monitor their activities.  This system led to 
the well-orchestrated hunger strikes that would take place.81  Baader’s access to 
information was such that he was “able to monitor everybody’s weight loss and therefore, 
any noncompliance with the discipline of the strike.”82  Even the commercial radios that 
they had were rigged to “receive police and other security messages, to broadcast 
themselves, to interfere with police communications, and to detonate remote-control 
bombs.”83 
C. SCHLEYER AFFAIR 
This success sealed the SPD’s willingness to place armed force among the 
legitimate powers of the state in its defense of democracy.  Helmut Schmidt ended 1977 
roundly praised for his leadership skills under pressure and his ability to circumvent the 
worst of party politics.  On 19 October, the RAF killed Hans Martin Schleyer, the 
President of the Federation of German Industry.  On September 5, 1977, the RAF 
undertook what was certainly its largest action, kidnapping Hans Martin Schleyer, who, 
as the president of the Federal Association of German Industries and the president of the 
Federal Employers Association, was probably Germany's most important and influential 
capitalist.  They demanded the release of eleven leading RAF prisoners in exchange for 
Schleyer.  This kidnapping elicited a state of emergency.  A stalemate punctuated by 
police actions against perceived RAF supporters continued until October 13 when a 
Palestinian commando calling himself “Commando Martyr Halimeh” of the Struggle 
Against World Imperialism Organization (SAWIO) hijacked a Lufthansa airliner en route 
from Palma de Majorca to Frankfurt, Germany.  They demanded the release of the eleven 
aforementioned RAF prisoners, as well as two members of the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) being held in Istanbul.  The RAF also issued a 
communiqué supporting this action and reiterating the demands. 
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Following five days of tense negotiations, negotiations which saw German 
Secretary of State Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski visit several nations to include: Algeria, 
Libya, Yemen, and Iraq, to which he was seeking a country willing to accept the 
prisoners, and during which the prisoners were put in complete isolation and even denied 
access to their lawyers and any form of media .  With the unanimous support of the crisis 
management team and the agreement of the Somali government, stormed the hijacked 
plane, Landshut on October 18, while it was waiting to refuel in Mogadishu by 
Germany's crack anti-terrorist unit the GSG-9, which was created in 1972 by the 
expansion of the BGS.84  Three of the four hijackers were killed, the fourth, Irmgard 
Moeller, who was stabbed, was severely injured, and more importantly to the German 
government, all 86 hostages escaped harm.  In retaliation for the killings of the 
Commando Martyr Halimeh and the prisoners, the RAF executed Schleyer, leaving his 
body in the trunk of a car in the French border town of Mullhausen.   
D. PROPAGANDA AND THE MEDIA 
During the entire Schleyer crisis, the governments decided on a news blackout, 
and asked the press not to endanger the investigation through their reporting and are 
were, overall, supported by the National Press Council.85  The problem was the unusually 
long kidnapping, 45 days all together, allowed foreign new services to break the 
unwritten agreement between the West German government and its press.  News 
organizations from Holland and France received information from the Baader-Meinhof 
group and they then printed and televised the information.  The German press would then 
follow suit and print the information while citing the foreign news agencies.  
Coincidently, an Allensbach opinion poll revealed that 70% of those questioned found the 
“news blackout reasonable and justified and did not demand dramatic stories or blow-by-
blow reporting.”86   
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Another way the German government tried manipulating the press in its battle 
against the terrorists was the calculated release of information at times that served its 
interests.  During the trials of Baader and the others, the Federal Republic was concerned 
that the statements made by the defendants would turn the trial and proceeding into a 
political platform and spread their propaganda.  As the Stuttgarter Nachrichten reported 
in 1974: 
The judicial authorities now possess comprehensive material, which reveal 
that the Baader-Meinhof people intend to transform the forthcoming trial 
into a political demonstration.  The entire system in the Federal Republic 
is to be put in the dock87 
In direct response to the attempts of the terrorists, the Federal government tried to 
circumvent this problem by using the media.  The Federal Public Prosecutor Buback 
admitted in 1975 to providing the public with potentially harmful information to the 
defendants and their case.   
Federal Public Prosecutor Buback expressed his support for a campaign of 
providing the public offensive information on the Baader-Meinhof gang.  
He stated, however, that the important factors were how, when, and which 
information was passed on.88   
The Federal government published a “documentation on the activities of violent 
anarchists” containing parts of defending counsel’s letters evidence, investigating files, 
and other information related to the case.89  The Minister of the Interior, Werner 
Maihofer, stated, “[e]very line of this published material will have been the subject of 
consultation between the Federal Public Prosecutor and the Federal Office of Criminal 
Investigation, which means that informing the public in this manner will result only in 
benefits and in no damage whatsoever.”90  The defendant’s complaint that the releasing 
of the information was both detrimental and illegal in German Law was ignored by the 
judicial authorities by pointing out that the state of emergency took priority over the law.  
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The government in a sense was trying to do what Martha Crenshaw described as “de-
legitimation” of the polices and practices designed to decrease the legitimacy of the 
terrorists or to undermine their political support. 91     
E. BUNDESKRIMINALAMT AND THE BUNDESGRENZSCHUTZ 
The violence led directly to the unprecedented strengthening of personnel in 
various offices.  For example, the Federal Criminal Office increased from 933 in 1969 to 
slightly over 2,500 in 1977.92  This office was now the central agency for information 
and communication on combating terrorism.  The Federal Frontier Protection Force was 
extended to supplement the existing police force.  Faced with this growing threat, in the 
1970s Horst Herold, head of Germany's Bundeskriminalamt (BKA, or federal police), 
had a bold plan: to create a computer network for electronic profiling.  This would allow 
the BKA to mine data from real-estate agencies, utility companies, and other sources, in 
hopes of pinpointing the terrorists' whereabouts.  The SPD-led government increased 
funds and personnel for the Federal Criminal Office (Synonymous with BKA) and the 
Federal Border Control (Bundesgrenzschutz or BGS), the organ with the sole 
responsibility for anti-terrorism countermeasures.  In 1971, the BGS began to guard 
airports.  Updating and expanding the use of information and communications used by 
the West German police.  This choice vice the use of brute strength was the choice that 
both the BKA and BGS favored.  The government argued that only the improvement of 
such methods would increase police chances of apprehending criminals, early detection, 
and perhaps even help police to anticipate terrorist actions.  “Unsaid was that an 
emphasis on police technologies also allowed the Social Democrats to avoid overt 
repression, a centralized executive power, and the creation of new legislation and thus 
avoid major internal party conflict over the issue of strong state power.”93 
Prior to this both the BKA and the BGS relied on the state level for 
implementation—requiring each state to invite the federal agencies into any criminal or 
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terrorist investigation before either was free to act.94  When Herold initiated the 
aforementioned nationwide program in data mining and computer profiling, much was 
already known about the terrorists.  “The police knew that they rented apartments to 
conduct their crimes,” recalls Hansjürgen Garstka, the State of Berlin's commissioner for 
data protection and freedom of information.   
But they used them only a couple days before the event.  Also, the police 
knew these people paid their electricity and rent only in cash.   
The terrorists preferred high-rise apartments with underground garages and direct 
access to the highway, and they were primarily young and German.  Profile in hand, the 
police contacted electricity companies, to find out which apartments used no or little 
electricity, and apartment complexes, to find out which people paid in cash; they also 
combed through household registrations (German citizens are required to register with 
the state).  “The results were all merged, and in the end, they found one flat which fit 
absolutely this profile,” Garstka says.  Police put the apartment under surveillance and 
soon seized RAF member Rolf Heissler.  It was a stunning achievement and widely 
hailed by the law enforcement and intelligence community.  Unfortunately, for Herold, it 
was illegal infringing on civil liberties.  Press accounts about the BKA program fueled a 
public outcry, which soon ended the effort and forced Herold to resign. 
In April 22, 1976, the first anti-terrorism law and the 14th Amendment Act of the 
Criminal Law respectively criminalized the formation of terrorist organizations and 
supporting and encouraging serious violent crimes.  These provisions made it a criminal 
offense for anyone to endorse offenses with the intent to threaten the West German 
Constitution.  In addition, any person promoting or assisting in an association that was 
designed to commit terrorists’ acts could receive a ten-year sentence and another example 
was the state’s ability to monitor any correspondence between lawyer and clients.  95  
April 22, 1976 Section 129 and 129A were amended to the constitution.  This made it 
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explicitly illegal to form a “terrorist organization.”96  Section 129 of the Criminal Code 
criminalized the formation or membership of an association whose aims or activities are 
directed towards the commission of crime.  Section 129a provided for an even more 
severe penalty if the association is a terrorist association. 
In the fight against the supporters of terrorists, there were times when the 
defendant was either underground or outside the sovereign borders of West Germany or 
trying to obstruct the trial, and there was several amendments to the Criminal code in 
order to deal with those situations.  Sections 231a, 231b, and 255 were created to hold 
hearings in the absence of the accused if he “intentionally and willfully causes his own 
unfitness to stand trial.”97  If a trial was required to be held in a defendant’s absence and 
he does not have an attorney then one would have been appointed by the court.  Likewise, 
if the accused, having sought to avoid trial by leaving the country or by some medical 
pretext suddenly regained his mental fitness and his ability to stand trial then the judge 
must tell him all the events that took place in his absence.98  The second part of this 
section states, “the presence of the accused may be dispensed with even before 
interrogation on the matter at issue, provided he has been given opportunity to plead to 
the charge.”99  The most controversial article was the exclusion of defense attorneys 
based off their previous history and possible shady ways100  Otto Schily, defense attorney 
of Gudrun Ensslin, was excluded from representing her by the order of the Investigating 
Judge of the Federal Supreme Court.  This was affirmed by the Third Criminal Senate of 
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the Federal Supreme Court on August 25, 1972 but was reversed by the decision of the 
Federal Constitutional Court in February 1973 because there were no grounds. 
In response to the problems with the lawyer-client relationship during the trials of 
Ensslin, Raspe and others, the Kontaktsperregesetz (Contact Ban Law) was instituted on 
September 20, 1977.101.  The Federal Republic passed this special law a week after its 
introduction to the Bundestag.  Given the history of the snail like movement of German 
Bureaucracy, this was nothing short of remarkable.  A normal law could take months if 
not years to pass and only three members of the Bundestag voted against the law.  
Essentially this gives the presiding judge the authority to enforce a strict contact ban 
between the convicted terrorists and anyone else they so desire, not just the lawyers.  This 
was largely established because of the shady conduct of attorneys, like Otto Schily, the 
current Minister of Interior, and the first generation of RAF leaders at the Stammheim 
prison.102  One such example of potential foul play between lawyers and their clients was 
on November 30 1976 when two lawyers; Siegfried Haag and Roland Mayer, were 
arrested at a routine autobahn checkpoint.  There were papers found in the vehicle that 
showed what new actions the terrorist group was planning.  In addition, the bank notes 
that they possessed were the same ones that had been taken during recent bank robberies 
in Hamburg and Cologne.103  The first arrests occurring because of this law took place 
only one month later with the arrest of a Baader-Meinhof lawyer Arnt Muller in Stuggart 
and then in December with the arrest of Klaus Croissant after he was extradited from 
France.  On February 16, 1978, five articles of the Criminal Code were amended to 
include search warrants, police checkpoints, apprehension of suspects, and conduct of the 
defense attorney after the assassination of Chief Federal Prosecutor Sigefried Buback. 
Section 88a of the Criminal Code punished support of offences against the 
Constitution.  Up to three years of jail time could be ordered if the offender  
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disseminates, publicly issues, placards, produces or otherwise renders 
accessible a text that supports an unlawful act named in section 126104, or 
who obtains, provides, keeps, offers, announces, praises, or attempts to 
import or export it within the spatial jurisdiction of the German Criminal 
Code.105  Other changes to the Criminal Code of importance were Section 
131, “glorification of violence” and Section 140, public “approval of 
criminal acts.106 
The law-and-order tactics employed by the state awoke fears about Germany’s 
inability to break free from its authoritarian and fascist past.  There was a split among 
generational lines, as Karrin Hanshew stated, “the older generation moving with alarm to 
avert a repetition of Weimar, while their children railed loudly against perceived 
continuities with National Socialism.”107  There was a great fear that some of the 
legislation might seriously curtail civil liberties, but in 1973 after the Munich debacle, the 
BKA was given a much larger scale of central authority.  This was to include the broad 
use of electronic data processing equipment and an electronic intelligence system for all 
the BKAs forces, Federal and in the Lander.   
One huge problem is the fact that at this time West Germany did not have a 
federal type police organization similar to that of the United States that would thus allow 
the integration of all the information obtained on the terrorists and their supporters.  The 
Office for the Protection of the Constitution was created in order to centralize the 
antiterrorist campaign.  The office was now in charge of analyzing and trying to 
understand all aspects of terrorist activity.  Their job was of the most difficult variety, 
uncover a support systems and discover underground personnel and operations all while 
not infringing on the civil liberties or ruffling the feathers of the previous generations 
ordeal with the Nazi’s.   
The path pursued by the coalition government throughout the 1970s in its desire 
to combat terrorism was not one of new, anti-terrorism legislation and harsher criminal 
punishment (the conservatives’ answer), however, nor did it justify itself overtly in the 
name of “militant democracy.”  After the Hanns-Martin Schleyer kidnapping, Helmut 
                                                 
104 Disturbance of the Public Peace by threatening to Commit Crimes. 
105 German Criminal Code Section 88a. 
106 German Criminal Code Sections 131 and 140. 
107 Hanshew, p. 26. 
39 
Schmidt called a meeting of the Krisenstab (crisis management team).  This team was 
first conceived during the Stockholm hostage crisis in 1975 by Chancellor Schmidt and 
consisted of his ministerial cabinet and the House Speaker of each parliamentary party.  
For the length of the “German Autumn”108, the crisis management team was the ruling 
body, responsible for all negotiations with the terrorists and the enactment of security 
measures such as the ban on all news related to the terrorist situation.  This move by the 
government to facilitate expedient decision-making in situations where time was 
considered crucial did generate accusations of unconstitutional behavior and abuse of 
power from within the party ranks of the SPD.  The crisis management team ultimately 
concentrated decision-making powers in the hands of the executive.  Arguing that each 
party was represented on the committee, the need to consult parliament in matters of 
national importance was effectively curtailed.109  
F. AMENDMENTS TO THE CRIMINAL CODE 
In the meantime, the German legislature in 1986 amended the criminal code to 
allow such computer searches under certain circumstances.110  The government learned 
to tough it out during Schleyer’s captivity and the Mogadishu hijacking, crisis staffs and 
the Federal Criminal Office (BKA) took on sweeping authority in the country and at 
times took liberties with the constitutional protections and rights of individual citizens in 
order to track down the terrorists.  These sweeping reforms were eerily similar to that of 
the Nazi’s relative quick rise to power in the 1930s, especially to anyone that had lived or 
had any knowledge of that era.    
In 1989, the Bundestag approved the Kronzeugeregelung, a variation of 
Italy’s Penitence Law.111  The German version provided for reduction of 
sentences for terrorists who collaborate, in certain cases the commutation 
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to time served.  In addition, the German version does not allow for simple 
dissociation.  A key law was passed in 1989 that allowed Aussteiger 
(repentant terrorists) to be allowed to receive reduced sentences or even 
released from detention in return for cooperating with police and divulging 
information.112   
Other aspects of the German Criminal Code were amended as well.  Specifically 
the reduction of a terrorist holding hostages and agreeing to release them, as well as 
attacks on aviation and then sub sequentially releasing the hostages.    
A serious dilemma facing the government was the issue of posting “wanted 
signs.”  At the height of the terrorist’s attacks, many storeowners were reluctant to post 
those signs on their grounds for the fear of retaliation from the terrorists themselves.  This 
situation is very similar to the threat of the mafia in cities like New York and Chicago.  It 
seemed more dangerous to act on behalf of the state than it is to act against or at the very 
least remain neutral.113 
G. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM  
Despite its domestic terrorist foundation, there were several ties into international 
terrorism.  The researcher has chosen Paul Wilkinson’s definition of international 
terrorism that was gathered from his book Terrorism and the Liberal State.  He states,  
terrorists acts can also be accurately designated “international” if they are 
committed as a result of connivance, collaboration or alliance between 
terrorists and the governments, terrorist movements or factions of foreign 
states.  In short, political terrorism becomes international in the strict sense 
when it is (i) directed at foreigners or foreign targets; (ii) concerted by the 
governments or factions of more than one state; or (iii) aimed at 
influencing the policies of a foreign government.114   
With the advent of ties to the international terrorists another problem came about, 
that of the German readiness to give way and release prisoners in lieu of dealing with 
hostage takers.  This did not go unnoticed by several terrorists groups.  Germany had a 
history of caving in to terrorist’s demand in three such instances.  Interestingly enough, it                                                  
112 This information was gained from Maria Rasmussen, Associate Professor, National Security 
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was the Germans and Japanese that were most likely to give into the terrorists demands, 
and quite possibly could be that both have a similarity in the link to a fascist history and 
where trying to dispel the belief that they had a lack of concern or regard for human life.  
In 1970, three hijacked aircrafts and its passengers were held on the Dawson’s Field in 
Jordon.  While these planes were not of German origin, they were British, Swiss, and 
American, there were numerous West Germans on board those planes.  It is believed that 
the German Government put enormous pressure on the Swiss and British governments to 
release the prisoners earlier than was expected.  The second event took place on February 
1972, when a German Boeing 747 was hijacked to Aden and the German government 
paid a five million dollar ransom for the safety of the hostages.  On September 5 of the 
same year, eight members of the Black September group kidnapped 11 Israeli athletes at 
the Munich Olympics.  In this case, the government did not pay anyone or release any 
political prisoners but rather released the actual remaining terrorists after they were 
captured after another hijacking took place.  Finally, on February 27, 1975, the June 2 
Movement kidnapped Peter Lorenz in Berlin and demanded the release of six prisoners.  
One of those released was Gabriele Krocher-Tiedemann.  She was then part of a 
combined team consisting of Palestine and German terrorists that abducted 11 oil 
ministers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  The three 
police officers were killed, the Austrian government flew them to Algiers and it is 
believed that some of the Arab countries paid approximately 25 million dollars to get the 
ministers freed.  Chancellor Schmidt was mortified and furious at the leniency towards 
the terrorists.  In October of 1977, the kidnapping of Dr Hans-Martin Schelyer changed 
when a Lufthansa aircraft was hijacked by four Arab terrorists demanding the release of 
the RAF leaders as well as some Arab prisoners.  The plane was denied entrance into 
airspace by several countries before it finally landed in Mogadishu.  Chancellor Schmidt 
now was able to change the pattern of giving in to terrorists demands by sending in the 
GSG-9 to secure the rescue of the hostages, which they did in a perfect manner, and 
killed three of the four hijackers.   
There were attempts, starting in the early eighties, to create an alliance with other 
terrorist groups in Europe.  Attempts with the French Action Directe (AD), the Belgian 
Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) and even the Italian Red Brigades were made to 
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combat and strike at NATO and American assets and interests.  The first piece of 
evidence showing cooperation took place on January 25, 1985 during the assassination of 
the French defense official General Rene Audran.  There is belief that the attack included 
cooperation with several RAF members.115  This attack occurred only 10 days after the 
RAF and the AD publicly announced a joint statement stating the formation to combat 
NATO imperialism.116   
The evolution of the student protesters and the 68ers into the RAF, RZ, and 2 
June Movement terrorist groups now led the West German government to react in various 
ways including knee-jerk ad-hoc measures, manipulating the media to its advantage, 
massive legislative amendments and changes to the Basic Law and the German Criminal 
Code.  Nevertheless, the overriding question that remained was; were these measures at 
this time effective in combating the left-wing terrorists.  
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IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MEASURES 
Now that the measures taken by the West German Government have been 
discussed, it only makes sense to analyze those measures.  Was the government too strict, 
too forceful, and too aggressive?  How cognizant was the government of its devious past 
with respect to curtailing civil liberties and potentially suppressing and infringing on 
citizens rights?  Can a democratic society subdue terrorism without surrendering the 
values central to the system.  The overriding question that needs to be addressed is did 
the government and the judicial system cause the downfall of the left-wing terrorists or 
did the terrorists simply implode and cause their own demise by isolating the public, the 
non-fringe leftists, and turning to more violence.  These questions are among the few that 
are to be addressed in the forth-coming pages.   
The German government was effective in combating terrorism in some manner 
but the benefit of having hindsight enables us to see that several mistakes occurred by the 
West German government and policy makers but also by the left-wing terrorists 
themselves.  Ultimately, there were two main objectives for the Red Army Faction 
(RAF), first they hoped that the state would introduce and enact measures that were over 
the top and draconian.117  Overall, they were successful in this, for example, denying any 
public demonstrations for any organization that promoted dangerous behavior and the 
infringing rules placed on the defendant-lawyer interaction, but failed to meet the primary 
objective, which was to muster the support of the masses in unveiling the oppressive 
ways of the state.  Did the government really change its ways when the terrorists changed 
theirs?  As compelled by the Ministry of the Interior, there were 1,493 violent acts 
committed in the 1970s causing 99 deaths and 404 injured.  Forty percent of the attacks 
were directed at the police.  In the 1980s, there were 13,073 violent incidents, 95.2% 
committed by left-wing terrorists.118  The government had three broad consequences it 
had to keep in mind before any laws were passed or measures taken to combat the 
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terrorists.  First, the loss of confidence in the government could not occur for this would 
drastically affect the ability of the government to ensure the safety of all its citizens.  
Second, the government could not allow the terrorists to obtain any of its political goals.  
Third, any changes in regards to civil liberties had to be carefully scrutinized.  
How do you combat terrorism if you are not sure what you are combating is 
terrorism.  In Alex Schmid’s book, there were 109 different definitions of terrorism 
provided between 1936 and 1981, and there have been more since.119  The Germans view 
of terrorism was greatly different from that of the British.  For example, in 1985, the 
German Federal Republic Office for the Protection of the Constitution stated: 
“[t]errorism is the enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended 
to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially 
by means of severe crimes as detailed in article 129a, section one of the penal code or by 
means of other acts of violence, which served as preparation of such criminal acts.”120  
Conversely, the United Kingdom in 1974 stated, “for the purposes of the legislation, 
terrorism is the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the 
purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.”121  The difference 
between the countries respective statements is even more evidence of the German fears 
about their Nazi past.  The British definition is much broader and encompassing, it was 
offense if you simply put fear into a portion of the public, whereas the Germans 
definition was much more focused on specific events and activities, such as life and 
property, thus reducing the ability of the government to have total empowerment as stated 
in section 129a, section one.  Having said that, the German government was much stricter 
in comparison to other European nations on some issues.  “About 12 percent of the total 
number of violent incidents is related to breaches of transport and other resistance 
activities.  Some other European governments do not consider these activities as terrorists 
but as politically-motivated activism.”122 
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A. WHY GERMANY? 
The first key question was why was Germany a feeding ground for left-wing 
terrorism?  As Therese Delpech points out, there had been a great deal of suspicion that 
Germany was a shelter for some terrorists or supporter for terrorists.123  The problem for 
Germany being a feeding ground was threefold.  First,  
democracies have well-known weaknesses when facing terrorism.  Among 
those is their openness, their dedication to freedom of speech and 
information, their defense of minorities and the rights of accused persons.  
In large part, Germany was vulnerable to terrorism because of its free press and 
democratic values.  Also, the Western democracies have tended to be the most attractive 
and vulnerable targets of international terrorism not only because they are open societies 
with an unregulated media, but also because they can least easily combat the terrorist 
using terrorist tactics, that is, the use of terror in retaliation.  Secondly, there has been, 
and still is, a great fear of another German nightmare if people’s liberties and freedoms 
are curtailed.  History and memory have a powerful effect on policy and the German 
experience was proof of this.  “[T]he authorities, sensitive to the country’s Nazi past, 
have been reluctant to introduce measures that could be seen as intrusive on the rights of 
citizens.”124  Interestingly enough, this problem has come full circle with some of the 
68ers now in prominent positions being weary of the states response to the RAF and 
others. Third, the private lives of citizens are not the business of the state and they want 
their privacy protected.  This freedom allows the terrorists to have the ability of 
movement and association with other supporters that are unattainable in non-democratic 
states. 
What methods were effective?  In order to win the battle you have to decrease the 
public’s support of the terrorist or not allow them to further increase their support 
network.  The terrorist movement does not have an unlimited life span.  If after a period 
of time, whether years or decades, that the murdering of innocent businessmen or 
politicians has not brought them close to their goal than their resolve will drastically 
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dwindle.  This is especially true for the urban-guerrilla type terrorism that the RAF and 
others engaged in as compared to nationalist terrorists, like the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) that tends to hold out longer because of a wider based support.  Legislative matters 
are another way to suppress the young radicals.  Possibly one method that might have 
been chosen was to provide greater power to the lower courts to intervene in crimes that 
would ultimately tie into terrorism.  The Spanish in their ongoing battle against terrorism 
adopted the measure of increasing the power given to the lower courts.  Giving the local 
courts more power vice the initial overreaction from the government might have subdued 
the violent backlash that soon took place.  Focus needed to be on the support system and 
the assets that the radicals had.  Another possibility should have been the initiation of 
giving financial rewards for the exchange of pertinent information.  An example of this 
was when Uruguay offered a reward for information to leading to the rescue of kidnapped 
victims ($20,000 to $90,000 or the arrest and conviction of a Tupamaro ($8,000)).  In 
addition, the British used this tactic in Cyprus while dealing with an Ethnike Organosis 
Kypriakou Agonos (EOKA) cell.125  
Terrorism is fundamentally a form of psychological warfare.  The left-wing 
terrorists, for that matter any terrorists, are targeting this warfare on a target audience and 
fear and intimidation are a profound part of their strategy.  If the terrorists are able to 
undermine the government’s ability to maintain order and peace than panic and chaos 
will follow shortly and the terrorists will have succeeded in their goal to create an 
anarchic society.  
One area that the German government had failed in, and actually the burden more 
accurately falls on the local police, was their initial over reaction in the infancy stages of 
the student movements.  This brutal and unnecessary violent approach was one, if not the 
spark, to start the fire that would become the left-wing terrorist movement.  The police 
tried to follow the fundamental view that Christopher Hewitt expressed in his extensive 
studies that concluded what many would deem obvious “the more terrorists in prison, the 
lower the violence level.”126 
                                                 
125 Christopher Hewitt, The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies, University Press of America, 
1984, p. 100. 
126 Ibid, p. 47. 
47 
Determining how best to reduce Germany’s vulnerabilities was a huge challenge 
that cut across federal, state, and local governments and the private sector.  Germany’s 
challenge was to discern the strategies of terrorists, especially as the terrorists adapt to 
efforts that the Germans and others make to protect themselves; to assess their 
vulnerabilities; to gauge the effectiveness of their measures to protect themselves and 
recover from an attack; and to weigh the costs of those measures, including the economic 
and social ones.  In this situation, characterized by numerous vulnerabilities but 
constrained resources, it is as important to decide what not to do as what to do.  The 
challenge cuts across almost all policy domains and makes a mockery of the idea that 
national security and domestic policy are separate.  It requires a large vision of the 
research agenda and a comprehensive approach to the problem so that German citizens 
can be assured that their government is focusing a sensible amount of resources on key 
vulnerabilities.  The important thing to remember is that, no matter how powerful the 
terrorist group is, it is still in the minority when compared to the entire population; and 
the government must keep it that way and do not give the terrorists any undue just 
publicity or help.  Restraint is necessary to both pursuing objectives and retaining 
legitimacy in combating terrorism.  Premature action against individuals, for example, 
can be counterproductive if it interferes with developing intelligence in depth that might 
neutralize an entire terrorist group.  Similarly, overreaction, such as imposing severe 
populace and resource control measures, can undermine legitimacy and unnecessarily 
irritate the civilian populace.  This was evidently a considerable cause for the breakout of 
terrorist groups and actions in the 1960s.   
B. WHAT SHOULD GERMANY HAVE DONE? 
How should have the West German government combated terrorism in order to 
combat terrorism more effectively?  There are four key points that should be analyzed.127  
First, focus efforts at mid-level leaders in terrorist groups.  A measure that the Germans 
tried was targeting the top leaders of a terrorist group, which was very often ineffective.  
The success or failure of a terrorist organization's operations, even perhaps its longevity, 
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depends more on the ability of the mid-level leaders to step into decision-making roles or 
carry out operational objectives than on the top leaders themselves.  The Germans, for 
example, often removed the top leadership of the Red Army Faction, but this policy did 
not result in a dramatic decrease in terrorist attacks or the dissolution of this group, and it 
could be argued that a reverse effect took place.  Once Andreas Baader was imprisoned, 
his fellow comrade and co-founder Ulrike Meinhof and a couple of the linchpins broke 
into his cell and freed Baader.  His status and aura were quickly elevated greatly beyond 
what they had been before he was imprisoned.128  Israel with Hezbollah and Hamas is 
another example of leaders being taken out of the picture but someone else “stepping-up” 
and leading the faction.  In the RAF, numerous top-level leaders were imprisoned or 
committed suicide, but to no avail.  The mid-level leaders of the group were able to step 
into the new role of top decision makers relatively easily.  It needs to be restated that 
three of the original founders and proponents of this social revolutionary movement 
killed themselves in October 1977129, but the movement survived and lived on for 
another twenty years.  Two examples of the group continuing its some fifteen plus years 
later were the assassination of Detlev Rohwedder in 1991, who was the point man for the 
agency that was to privatize the state holdings of former communist East Germany and 
the 1993 operation that destroyed a new prison.  The ensuing shootout ended in the death 
of a GSG-9 officer and RAF member Wolfgang Grams.130   
Second, the government needs to de-legitimize the entire group and their standing 
in society, not just arrest or kill the top leaders of terrorist groups.  The German 
government failed in this critical area to the greatest degree.  It appears that there was a 
great deal of relaxation after the arrest of Baader, Ensslin, Raspe, and Meins in 1970 by 
the government.  The inability to squash the standing in the society thus caused splinter 
groups like Revolutionary Cells and Movement 2nd June to come about as well as 
internationally speaking they were unable to isolate the urban guerilla warfare philosophy 
from other nations.  It must be stated that the latter is and was much more difficult to deal 
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with since effectively combating international terrorism would require international 
support on all levels from various nations.  Third, target essential support and logistics 
networks, for without money, lodging, and transportation, a terrorist existence will be 
substantially ineffective.  By incorporating measures into the 14th amendment in the 
Basic Law, as well as adding articles into the German Criminal Code, this enabled? the 
government to meet the goal.  Fourth, establish a dedicated counterintelligence center to 
obstruct terrorist reconnaissance.  The centralizing of the BGS and giving it the necessary 
manpower and funding allowed the consolidation of intelligence and increase the ability 
of counterterrorism.   
In the late 1960’s onward, the government seemed to be surprised by the growing 
support for the terrorists and, as mentioned in the previous chapter, enacted stopgap 
measures to subdue the problems occurring in the state.  The basic problem in this 
premise is that playing off security against liberty is a problem central to all politics.  
This is a problem still looming over Germany today.  As Mr Fritz Teufel has added, “it is 
not possible to have either absolutely.  It is always a question of either-or, of balance.”131 
The taking of hostage for political gain is one of the most dramatic and 
potent forms of contemporary terrorism.  No other tactic is more likely to 
cause a severe disruption to the normal flow of national and international 
relations.  Governments are truly held to ransom and political order 
directly threatened.132   
The Federal Republic of Germany was in a quagmire that all democratic nations 
are faced with at some point in time.  An overreaction to hostage taking that results in the 
avoidable deaths of hostages while security forces are attempting to neutralize terrorists, 
for example, raises questions of judgment as well as the legitimacy of the undertaking.  
The deaths of hostages can call into question the legitimacy of trying to rescue them 
because statistically speaking the hostages are going to be released if the government 
stands pat and negotiates.  Approximately 94% of all hostages from 1970 to 1982 have 
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been released regardless of whether demands have been met.133  Conversely, perceived 
softness can be just as detrimental for the government in trying to deter future terrorist 
attacks.  The latter issue surfaced when the West German government tried to deal with 
the Red Army Faction in the 1970s.  The West German government was severely 
criticized when they released six imprisoned terrorists and paid them 20,000DM after 
members of the June 2 Movement kidnapped Peter Lorenz, the Christian Democrat 
candidate for mayor of West Berlin.  Conversely, Chancellor Schmidt also was criticized 
for being far too aggressive for sending in the commando group GSG-9 to alleviate the 
hostage situation in Mogadishu.  However, by the end of 1977, the conservative Schmidt 
had gained the support of the liberal SPD members that had not supported him when he 
replaced the liberal Willy Brandt in 1974.  Schmidt had the general population believing 
that he was in charge and was going to lead the country through this difficult time with 
out falling back into any type of government or situation that troubled so many Germans 
so deeply.   
The SPDs’ attempt and success at restricting West German civil liberties was a 
key point during the Bundestag fight against terrorism.  The first such case where this is 
evident was with the “contact ban” (Kontaktsperregesetz).  Only taking three days to 
finish the law the Bundestag had, with the President’s endorsement, empowered the 
Federal Minister of Justice and his contemporaries at the State (Lund) level to restrain the 
prisoners’ contact with one another and with the entire outside world if there was a strong 
belief that the terrorists posed a “present danger to life, limb, or liberty.”  The isolation of 
the prisoner went so far as to ban the visitation rights of defending attorneys and all 
written communications.  The SPD rejected their earlier unwillingness to restrict civil 
rights and make legislative changes during a time of crisis, a surprise since the SPD had 
come to power on an agenda guaranteeing the liberalization of government and the 
socialization of society.134  The establishment of this law was one that proved to be a 
necessary step in order to disrupt the ongoing collaboration between the prisoners.  As 
documented in both Aust and Beckers books135, communication between the prisoners 
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was key and instrumental among the founding fathers of the RAF as well as the ensuing 
generations to continue organized terrorists activities while the leaders remained in prison 
cells. 
The strength of the conservative voice slowly took precedence against the 
younger, more liberal wing of the SPD.  This shift in the balance of internal party 
politics, intimately connected to the leadership’s successful resolution of the terrorist 
crisis and thus the party’s changed position on the legitimate use of state force, signaled 
the Social Democrats general tilt right.  Confident, however, that if the parliament and 
members of their party had access to the security information they possessed there would 
be no question as to whether their actions were warranted, the SPD leadership requested 
their party’s trust and promised to fully divulge suppressed information and minutes of 
committee meetings once the crisis had ended.  While it is true that the party’s leaders 
avoided centralizing power in the hands of “one strong man,” their readiness to sacrifice 
the rights of parliament and public sphere to the benefit of the functioning executive 
body, when coupled with the lack of dissent from the rank-and-file, confirmed that the 
SPD had come to abandon much of its previous position on state force. This new 
willingness on the part of the SPD to circumscribe checks on executive power ultimately 
allowed the last of their earlier convictions, namely their aversion to the display of 
coercive state force, to be overcome. 
In a matter of days, the party’s traditional deep distrust of state power retreated to 
the background as doubts about democracy’s ability to defend itself rose to the fore 
amidst a rhetoric pregnant with the terrors of Weimar, when law was lost to the streets 
under other SPD-led governments and (in their minds) a similar political extremism 
heralded in the Third Reich.136  One of the government’s first actions was the release of 
massive funds for the final creation of a centralized police information system—an act 
that not only threatened state rights, but also the rights of each West German citizen with 
its compilation of data on individuals other than those convicted of a crime. 
The left wing terrorist groups in Germany started to lose a portion of its potential 
supporters.  With age often comes wisdom.  In realizing that their armed eternal struggle 
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would not allow them to pay for homes, bills, or any materialistic items while in jail, 
many supporters slowly turned their attention to careers in politics and sought 
institutional reforms vice an outright revolution.  The emergence of the Green Party137 
had an undeniable effect on the pacification of the left-wing terrorist movement.  A new-
middle class has emerged with different social objectives. They viewed the efforts of the 
Greens in the parliaments of the Federal Republic, the Lander and the cities with 
sympathy.  Part of this middle class in the past supported the theories of the RAF or the 
RZ.138  
This middle class arose coincidently at the same time that anti-Americanism 
seemed to become a growing sentiment.   
C. WHAT WAS EFFECTIVE?  
The implementation of criminal law in of itself will not eliminate terrorism.  You 
must get to the root of the problem and in this case, it was the disgruntled youth of 
Germany.  There was this fear that the elders had lost control.  After the building of the 
Berlin Wall and the establishment of the grand coalition of Christian Democrats and 
Social Democrats in 1966, the youth felt that the older generation was no longer capable 
of solving the problems of the society.139  In addition, in the mid-1980s when the focus 
of terrorists attacks shifted to NATO and more so American targets, the German 
government never really focused on why this take place.  The politicians never carefully 
examined aspects of the U.S.-German relations that would thus fuel the anger and 
violence of the terrorists, such as the United States’s role in Vietnam and the issue of the 
presence of nuclear weapons in Germany. 
The most effective counter-terrorists measure might have been self-inflicted by 
the terrorists themselves.  When the left-wing movement changed from protesting and 
committing fires to a more violent and vicious agenda, a large portion of their base was, 
at the very least, with holding their support and questioning the movements’ methods.  
Joschka Fischer, captured this sentiment by stating, 
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[t]he more isolated we became politically, the more militaristic our 
Widerstand became, thus the easier we became to isolate and the easier it 
was for the cops to change our label from ‘political rockers’ to ‘terrorists,’ 
adding charges of criminal organization and murder to those of disturbing 
the peace.140 
Finally, the phenomenon of international terrorism has come into existence as a 
major problem only in the last few decades.  This is largely due to the revolution in 
communication and transportation technology that has made it possible for small groups 
of extremists both to reach target populations outside their domestic borders and to have 
their actions instantly broadcast worldwide by the western media.  The surprisingly small 
size of terrorist organizations makes tracking them down a challenge.  Germany was 
content with a policy that focused police attention only on possible terrorists acts 
committed on German soil, rather than concerning itself with the possible terrorist threats 
that extremist groups operating in Germany created for other countries or vice a versa.141  
Germany should have been concerned about terrorism beyond its own borders, because it 
was another avenue for the left-wing terrorists to expand its ideals, desires, and possible 
recruitment. 
While the RAF had ties to the PFLP and others, there was never that level of 
worldwide appeal against one enemy or one cause.  Dr. Nicholas Berry offered an 
important insight in this regard,  
if intelligence is the key weapon to thwart terrorist acts, pursuing justice is 
the key method to make them disappear…counter-terrorism involves a 
propaganda contest where the appearance of injustice must be dealt with.  
The terrorists' line must be made invalid — without, of course, ever saying 
that the redress of grievances is a product of a terrorist attack.142 
The problems is that often governments stop thinking about why terrorism has 
occurred once the initial legal, judicial, and police measures have been put into place.  
One must not confuse understanding with containment.  Unfortunately, this is exactly 
                                                 
140 For a reprint, see Frankfurter Spontis, “Uns treibt der Hunger nach Liebe, Zärtlichkeit und 
Freiheit” Links, Number 85, Sozialistische Zeitung, Offenbach, July/August 1976. 
141 Peter Katzenstein,  September 11th in Comparative Perspective: The Anti-Terrorism Campaigns in 
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what the West German government did.  A fight that the Germans had thought they had 
defeated when the RAF sent out their final communiqué in 1996.  Most German people 
were adamantly surprised to find out that several of the September 11 hijackers were 
living in Hamburg exposing the German people to the belief that terrorism, whether it be 
right-wing terrorism143 or international religious terrorism, could resurface at any 
moment.  The struggle against the terrorists just as the “war“ on crime, on cancer, on 
poverty, on drugs is never-ending and they thrive on the ability to adapt and overcome 
the countermeasures of the government.  In order to defeat terrorism or at the very least 
curtail it, one must use efforts that are tireless, innovative and forceful as the terrorists 
themselves.  These are all matters in which success is measured in terms of varying levels 
of control, rather than total eradication. 
Bruce Hoffman said it best when he put into perspective how the Europeans vice 
the Americans view the war on terrorism, “the United States tends to regard 
counterterrorism as something akin to a moral crusade, Europeans are far more skeptical 
of blanket approaches and rigid policies and instead adopt what they see as more practical 
and, in their minds, more productive approaches.”144  While Hoffman was talking about 
the situation after September 11, 2001, the tendencies and beliefs of the Germans and in 
general Europeans were the same during the era of left wing terrorism.  The German 
government had instituted and implemented various policies and procedures.  Some were 
effective and some were counter productive.  The government, the citizens, and even the 
terrorist themselves all were very aware of the history of suppression and terror of the 
government.  This proved a point that would affect all things involved during the struggle 
between the government and the terrorists.  
                                                 
143 See Bruce Hoffman’s, Right-Wing Terrorism in West Germany, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. MAJOR ARGUMENTS OF THE THESIS 
This thesis has examined when and how the emergence of left wing terrorism 
occurred in the Federal Republic of Germany.  It explains how and why the student 
protests and the Kommunal society it desired turned so lethal and disturbing. The West 
German government initially addressed the problems that had come about because of the 
existence of the radical left by a variety of means.  It expanded powers given to the 
Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) and Federal Border Control (Bundesgrenzschutz or BGS), and 
created the elite anti-terrorist unit, the GSG-9.  It passed the Kontaktsperregesetz 
(Contact Ban Law) and several other legislative measures Nevertheless; questions persist 
as to whether the government was forceful and decisive enough.  Did the actions taken by 
the government ultimately defeat the terrorists, or did the terrorist’s errors, 
miscalculations, and lofty dreams lead to its own demise?   
The Red Army Faction (RAF) not only rejected society as a whole in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, but also the world order which it described as capitalist, fascist, 
and repressive.  Horst Mahler, stated as his trial that “[t]he imperialist system forms a 
world-unit which transcends national boundaries…Exploitation and repression are 
globally organized.”145  This conscience decision to take on the entire capitalist society 
proved to be fatal in the RAF’s quest for change.  
The RAF weighed heavily on the media, as Bauman stated “the RAF said the 
revolution wouldn’t be built through political work, but through headlines, through 
appearances in the press, over and over again, reporting: ‘Here are the guerillas fighting 
in Germany’”. This was in complete contrast to the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA) and their struggles choosing terrorists activities and the use of the media but they 
equally used the political aspect of the Sinn Fein. 
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As Klein pointed out in the following passage, the left was failing to 
communicate, “they did nothing …they got used to broken windows, the battles with the 
police, even the petrol bombs.  So there came a point when it was decided that something 
new would have to be found”.146 
In the end it appears that, the RAF had some fundamental flaws that it was never 
able to overcome.  The inability to incorporate the other fringe groups into its system 
proved to be detrimental.  With only an estimated ten hardcore persons and 
approximately a peripheral support group of 200,147 the RAF appeared to the other left-
wing German terrorist to be an elitist.  Due to the size and nature of the RAF they were 
forced to be elaborately conspiratorial life-style, which the RZ [Revolutionary Cells] 
reasoned was one weakness of the RAF’s operating system.148    
While the RAF and others were trying to gain support from the non-radical left as 
well as the everyday German, the rhetoric of communist-like revolution was one that did 
not appeal to many West Germans.  They simply could not relate to the workers of 
Vietnam or Palestine.  The word communism was often parallel to depression and the 
German Democratic Republic.  Many families in the West had relatives in the East that 
were far worse off and could not afford many necessities that the West Germans had 
enjoyed.  Why then would this wave of terrorists be appealing if what they were striving 
for was a decrease in wealth.   
The history of the fascist past in Germany and the German mainstream that had 
generally accepted the changes that allowed increase powers to the security forces proved 
to be a large stumbling block for the RAF to overcome.  The Left had no reason not to 
distance itself from the ideological stance that the RAF had stood for.  However, it was 
not until April 20, 1998 that a mysterious eight-page letter arrived at the Reuters news 
agency, signed "RAF" with the machine-gun red star, declaring the group dissolved: 
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"Almost 28 years ago, on May 14, 1970, the RAF arose in a campaign of liberation. 
Today we end this project. The city guerilla in the shape of the RAF is now history."149 
Finally, what can one conclude about the emergence of left-wing terrorism in 
West Germany and how the Federal Republic of Germany dealt with this radical fringe 
group?  Several conclusions are in order.  First, in general, the German government was 
effective in combating the terrorists, but the terrorists themselves often committed 
mistakes that increased the government’s ability to be successful.  Second, it is likely a 
unified Germany will continue to take whatever measures are necessary to protect 
civilian population from the reemergence of terrorism and its ghastly consequences.  
After September 11, the German government for the first time banned three religious 
organizations, including the Caliph State and the Hizb ut-Tahir, which was accused of 
spreading violent anti-Semitic and anti-American propaganda.  This was something that 
would never have occurred before, even at the height of the battle against the RAF and 
others.  Even before September 11, 2001, the government was looking into abolishing the 
“privilege of religion” in the Law of Associations.150  Third, it is likely that Germany will 
now more than ever show virtually unconditional support towards combating 
international terrorism, something that the West German government was extremely slow 
and uneasy with during the 1970s and 1980s, even up until September 11, 2001. 
B. TERRORISM IN GERMANY TODAY 
While the underlying beliefs and views of the terrorists groups might have 
changed over time, many problems that faced the German government and police in the 
sixties still face them today.  After the left wing terrorism of the 1960’s and ’70s was 
dealt with, there was a general tranquility and calmness from the unification of Germany 
until September 11, 2001.  Within a few days of the attacks on the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon, most Germans knew that at least three of the nineteen terrorists 
suspected of having hijacked the planes that had been living in Hamburg—including the 
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Egyptian student Mohamed Atta, who is said to have masterminded the attacks. Within a 
few weeks, they knew that Osama bin-Laden's German network had probably included as 
many as seventy other sleepers spread across most of the big cities of Western Germany,  
and that one hijacker had even been traced to a town in eastern Germany, a part of the 
country not known for extending hospitality or, for that matter, much in the way of safety 
to strangers.   
Upon hearing about the attacks across the Atlantic, the German government took 
several steps to combat terrorism.  There have been three major categories: (1) Measures 
taken immediately after the 9-11 attacks (2) First counter-terrorism package (3) Second 
counter terrorism package.151 Immediately following September 11 Chancellor Schroder 
called the Federal Security Council together.  The head of the Federal Chancellery 
established a security commission that is believed to meet daily. 152 “Their primary task 
is to analyze actual and potential danger to the Deutschland and to coordinate activities 
between different authorities and to prepare the necessary measures and decisions”, 
153Increase in security measures for transportation routes, border control, federal, U.S., 
and Israeli facilities were implemented.  Crisis management teams were created for 
various offices and improving air traffic safety occurred. 
The Germans have in fact given 100% support in combating terrorism, whether 
domestic or international, after September 11. The Germans provided 2,800 troops to the 
CENTCOM AOR, second only to the French, as well as Navy ships, aircraft, Special 
Forces, and humanitarian assistance. 154 However, many concerns and problems still lie 
ahead.  One of the key problems is that it is difficult to increase a nation’s anti-terrorist 
spending when Euro-zone nations cannot have a deficit greater than three percent of their 
gross domestic product.  The French have recently stated that they are both willing and 
ready to go beyond the three percent deficit requirement to ensure that their national 
needs are met.  Are the Germans willing to do the same?  Absolute security is impossible 
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and the “hardening” of targets takes a toll on the nation’s resources.  If so, are they 
willing to use those new resources in combating terrorism?  In the future after a lull 
between terrorist attacks will the people of Germany, as the United States have shown, be 
so affectionate towards a tax increase of any sort?  Maintaining international cooperation, 
curtailing some civil liberties, and manpower-intensive programs will all be needed to 
take on and defeat 21st century terrorists.  The biggest problem could be simply how to 
define this war on terrorism.  Bruce Hoffman said it best when he put into perspective 
how the Europeans vice the Americans view the war,  
…the United States tends to regard counterterrorism as something akin to a 
moral crusade, Europeans are far more skeptical of blanket approaches and 
rigid policies and instead adopt what they see as more practical and, in their 
minds, more productive approaches.155 
 
While the underlying beliefs and views of the terrorists groups might have 
changed over time many problems that faced the German government and police in the 
sixties, still face them today.  One-step that the Germans have done that would not have 
happened some thirty years ago was restraining the rhetoric that is used by some radical 
religious groups.  The issue of religious terrorism is indeed new to the Germans. 
 Now that Germany is reunited and is past its democratic growing pains, the 
German people can now look at the events of the previous generation in a different light.  
Recently the RAF has received what some would say is positive press coverage.   In 
Christopher Roth's film "Baader," RAF leader Andreas Baader is portrayed as a cool, 
womanizing gangster. The film itself resembles one long music video, with exploding 
bombs, sexy women, and a "Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid"-style shoot-out at the 
end.  Another feature film, Christian Petzold's "The Inner Security," portrays a terrorist 
couple on the run with their 14-year-old daughter. It must be pointed out that the RAF is 
never mentioned by name. In addition, a documentary that showed in cinemas across 
Germany, "Black Box Federal Republic Germany," sets the biographies of one RAF 
member, Wolfgang Grams, against that of one of the RAF's victims, the banker Alfred 
Herrhausen.  In addition, there recently has been a museum exhibition that has opened up 
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in Germany to promote Ulrike Meinhof and her beliefs.  This promotion of left wing 
terrorism in general and the RAF specifically, was unimaginable only several years ago.  
Why is that?  Wolfgang Gast, a journalist for the daily Die Tageszeitung stated: "[t]his 
topic can be looked at so impassionedly today because these ideas aren't a threat to the 
Federal Republic anymore, they can now be historicized.  This was unthinkable even ten 
years ago."156  Finally, in 2002 a comedy was released in theatres that depicted several 
middle-aged terrorists as individuals who now are trying to find a bomb that they had left 
back in the 1970s.  This is significant in the sense that just like when comedian and New 
Yorker David Letterman was able to go back on the air after September 11 and tell jokes 
about Osama bin-Laden, the German public are now able to put this period of upheaval 
and terror behind them and even are able to poke fun of that particular situation.157   
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